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This paper analyses a productive opportunity taken by a family-owned Brazilian soybean crusher 
(Imcopa) as it adapted its production system to sell certified non-GM soybeans products. Imcopa 
was Brazil’s first soybean crusher to implement a non-GM soybean traceability and certification 
system, in 1998. It is now held to be the world’s largest non-GM lecithin exporter. The analysis 
adopted here is based on a microeconomic perspective of productive opportunities identified by 
the firm, which goes beyond a simple balance-sheet approach. Four fundamental elements were 
used to guide the analysis: benefit-cost ratio; information asymmetry; bounded rationality; and 
company’s growth. The possibility of selling non-GM soy and soybean products on the 
international market has provided Imcopa with access to an even broader commercial network of 
feed and food products. This has given the company a better outlook on why it should diversify 
its activities and intensify its pace of growth. 
 
Keywords: non-GM soy, cost, benefit, traceability, certification 
 
 
Corresponding author:   Tel: + 55 41 3049 2443                 
Email: ruthofmann@gmail.com   
 
Other contact information:   V. Pelaez:    victor@ufpr.br   
    D.  Aquino:  dayani.aquino@gmail.com  
    M .   M e l o :       marcelofmelo@gmail.com   Pelaez et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
 





Imcopa – Importação, Exportação e Indústria de Óleos Ltda. was Brazil’s first soybean crusher 
to implement a soybean traceability and certification system for non genetically-modified (non-
GM) soybeans and products in 1998. As a pioneer, the company has expanded rapidly over the 
past decade, with invoicing up from $70 million USD in 1998 to nearly $1.3 billion in 2008. 
Growth came not only from the emergence of a profitable non-GM food market niche, but also 
from the identification and exploitation of new production opportunities related to that niche. 
 
This article analyses Imcopa’s experience in implementing a traceability and certification system 
for non-GM soybeans and products. Our analysis goes beyond a neoclassical approach based on 
an economic-financial diagnosis for a company seeking to optimize its resources in a substantive 
rational manner. We set out to shed light on a medium-size, family-owned company’s decision-
making process in a market dominated by major transnational’s and how investments could 
create a novel market niche for both domestic and export markets. While this market niche was 
being created there was a lot of incertitude concerning non-GM labeled products and the viability 
of investments, despite the fact the social resistance against genetically modified organisms in 
Europe became a central issue in the international trade between the United States and the 
European Union. In such context, this study follows the company’s decision making logic in the 
context of uncertainty by which the agents looked for new productive opportunities.  
 
We use an analytical framework that examines the costs and benefits of a given investment in 
which the parameters for decision making evolve with short-term and structural changes in 
supply and demand. These changes are caused mainly by the dynamic nature of technology; a 
company’s learning process, the discovery of new opportunities for production and institutional 
changes regarding the regulation of technology.  Our analysis discusses four major aspects, by 
following an historical approach of the company: the bounded rationality of players in decision 
making; the asymmetry of information related to an uncertain environment; the business benefit-
cost ratio; and the production opportunities identified by the firm based on the entrepreneur’s 
own image of the environment in which he operates. 
 
The data collected for this study came from interviews with Imcopa’s Director of Operations in 
three different periods: first in 2006, as part of a survey done by the Co-Extra Consortium
1; and 
then in 2008 and 2009, in order to update and expand the company’s experience in a new 
situation as the non-GM soybean market has consolidated both domestically and internationally.  
 
Section 1 presents a brief theoretical review relating to a firm’s investment decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty and asymmetry of information, in the specific context of the food 
market. Section 2 describes Imcopa’s profile as a producer before and after the implementation 
of its system for tracing and certifying non-GM soybeans and soybean products. Section 3 
briefly characterizes the tracing and certification system and then identifies major cost and 
benefit factors associated with its implementation. Section 4 presents some closing 
considerations. 
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Information Uncertainty and Asymmetry in the Food Market 
 
The commercial release of GM soybeans in the US and the EU in the late 1990s gave rise to a 
period of intense controversy on risks inherent to the production and consumption of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs). That controversy was enhanced by the spread of Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in several European countries, which revealed the 
questionable and unaccountable criteria used by expert committees responsible for analyzing, 
managing and communicating food-related risks (Miller 1999; Millstone and van Zwanenberg 
2001). 
 
The rejection of regulatory agencies’ risk analyses by consumer and environmental organizations 
in several European countries led governments to withhold the approval of GMOs. EU-wide 
harmonization policies adopted from 1992 to 1995 were destabilized by de facto moratoria 
declared by certain governments against the adoption of GMOs in their countries (Morris and 
Adley 2000) 2. Likewise, in Brazil, an attempt by the National Technical Biosafety Commission 
(CTNBio) to rush through the release of Monsanto’s GM soybeans in 1998 was held back by 
court injunctions obtained by the Brazilian Consumer Defense Institute (IDEC) and Greenpeace 
Brazil. During the next seven years, as ensuing litigation proceeded through courts, Brazil 
experienced large-scale debates over the risks and benefits to farmers and consumers of adopting 
GM soybeans3. 
 
Resistance against the release of GMOs in several European countries and the 2000 approval of 
labeling rules for food containing GMOs in the EU were decisive factors in the decision by 
major supermarket chains and food-industry groups to keep GMOs out of their product lines. 
Actually, uncertainties arising from controversy over the risks and benefits of producing and 
consuming GM food reflect a contemporary quandary, most prevalent in developed countries, 
that goes beyond quantitative food security, to qualitative safety aspects of the food supply. 
Meanwhile, with the expansion of global trade, particularly within new economic blocs, the 
harmonization of plant-health controls has become an enduring and complex problem. 
 
In the context of expanding international trade it is important to note that food products are no 
longer produced and consumed in the same country, thus compromising the enforceability of 
national food safety regulations, which have no cross-border efficacy. Responsibility for 
enforcement has actually been shifting from the public to the private sphere. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO), supermarket chains and some food corporations have begun to set and 
implement food quality standards nationally and internationally4. Increasingly, concentrated 
retail markets entail supermarket chains covering multi-country regions in which the same 
products are provided by a single supplier. On the other hand, this geographic reach can also 
increase the diversity of products offered by chain stores. Consequently the impact of any food 
                                                           
2 In 2000, the EU required labels for food with over 1% of its content consisting of GMOs (Regulation 49/2000). 
That limit was lowered to 0.9% by the Regulation 1829/2003. 
3 The legal deadlock was removed with the new 2005 Biosafety Law in, which permanently legalized illegal GM 
soybean crops, which were widespread mainly in Rio Grande do Sul. The illegal spread of GM soybeans in that 
State was facilitated by its common border with Argentina, where they were widely used and from where many 
growers smuggled seeds into Brazil. On this process, see Pelaez and Silva (2009) and Pelaez (2009). 
4 On this matter see also Braithwaite and Drahos (2001). Pelaez et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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safety problem is no longer a concern just for the small geographic area served by a supermarket, 
but for the entire area covered by the company’s chain stores. This fact increases the exposure of 
retail chains to liability for harm and also the risk of harm to its own reputation. Major retail 
chains thus tend to be leading players in the implementation of traceability systems, in order to 
identify failures in quality control throughout their supply chain as well as identifying 
responsibilities for any harm caused by shortcomings in their food quality-control systems 
(Hatanaka, Bain and Bush, 2005). 
 
Consequently, “third-party certification” (TPC) has emerged as an important institution to certify 
the quality of products offered for sale. According to Deaton (2004), third-party certifiers 
provide market signals concerning food quality claims. The strategic role of such signals is to 
reduce information asymmetry, the importance of which is growing in the perception of societies 
whose political agenda includes debating the inherent risks of adopting new technologies.  
 
According to Loader and Hobbs (1999), the asymmetric distribution of information in the food 
market gives more information on product quality to sellers than to buyers. This is because food 
is no longer a commodity whose features can be observed simply by visual inspection. Food 
products have become a specialty commodity whose quality-related features often can only be 
perceived when they are consumed. For these authors, impacts of information asymmetry in the 
food market can be handled in three, non-mutually-exclusive ways. The first solution is to 
introduce certification and labeling systems to assure product quality and safety firm-by-firm. 
The second solution is to implement a legal framework to assure labeling and an adequate level 
of quality control for food. The third solution is to have laws that hold companies accountable 
for food-safety failures, allowing them to be targeted by civil suits to establish liability and 
redress. Such measures tend to make companies more concerned about assuring the safety of the 
food products they market. 
 
Similarly, Tanner (2000) observes that companies with certified food products can enjoy several 
advantages: less risk of food-safety liability suits; a stronger defense through detailed 
assessments and inspections of the company (due diligence); a greater ability to comply with 
legislation; achievement of competitive advantages; ease of access to markets; national and 
international acceptance; lower costs and higher profits; lower insurance costs and more effective 
management. 
 
These advantages go beyond the distribution and manufacture links in the production chain to 
include farmers, final consumers and society at large. Advantages here include: lower production 
costs and prices for final consumers; higher-quality products and more value added; less chance 
for fraud by buyers who often make misleading claims about low-quality products; access to new 
markets; good labor practices including safer working conditions and better wages; enforcement 
of environmental recovery and preservation standards.  
 
Another important advantage of traceability and certification systems is that it gives agents a 
chance to identify new production opportunities. The recombination of productive resources 
required to implement these systems involves the creation of new services, which can allow new 
market segments or niches to emerge. Consequently, new opportunities identified by agents will 
provoke a reworking of their own productive resources. Quality decisions made by entrepreneurs Pelaez et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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thus depends upon identifying production opportunities a firm can seize, based on their ability to 
reorganize existing resources. A firm’s behavior regarding productive opportunities is guided not 
only by objective facts, but ultimately by expectations created by entrepreneurs regarding 
possibilities for growth (Penrose 2006). Diversification or differentiation of products through 
traceability and certification system expanded this firm’s potential for growth, while opening up 
new social and economic networks. In this new relational environment, agents’ decisions tend to 
vary depending on new elements that influence their own image of the environment and the 
decision-making process itself (Boulding 1961; Loasby 1976; Callon 1998). To the extent that 
rationality, or the agents’ decision-making process, depends on the environment in which they 
operate, their positioning along the chain (or multiple chains) of production also tends, in turn, to 
generate information asymmetries. 
 
Overview of Imcopa’s Production 
 
Founded in 1967, Imcopa is a medium-sized, family-owned company with approximately 450 
employees, located in the State of Paraná, in southern Brazil. The company’s soybean crushing 
capacity is around 2 million tons/year, or 5.5 tons/day, and 98% of its output is exported. It owns 
three soybean processing facilities, two of them located in soybean production areas and the third 
about 70 km from the country’s main soybean export port (Paranaguá). 
 
The crushing of 2 million tons/year yields approximately 1.5 million tons of soybean meal, with 
44-53% protein content. Twenty-four percent of that output (360,000 tons) is high-protein meal 
(60-70%). It also produces around 240,000 tons of refined oil, 20,000 tons of lecithin5   
(emulsifier), 230 tons of tocopherol (a precursor to vitamin E), 28,000 tons of molasses extracted 
from soybean meal and 7,000 tons of ethanol, obtained through fermentation of the molasses 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Soybean Products, Imcopa, 2008 
Products Total  Annual  Production 
Processed soybeans  2.0 million tons 
Meal  1.5 million tons 
High-protein meal   360,000 tons 
Refined oil  240,000 tons 
Lecithin 20,000  tons 
Fatty acid (tocopherol)  230 tons 
Molasses 28,000  tons 
Alcohol 7,000  tons 
Source: Traver (2008) 
 
Imcopa estimates the total world demand for lecithin is at around 50,000 tons/year, meaning its 
20,000 tons produced in 2008 accounted for 40% of global consumption. Only 20-22% of the 
lecithin is sold on the domestic market. Imcopa meets a major share of Nestlé’s demand for 
lecithin, and 100% of Kraft’s demand, in addition to sales to other major food companies. The 
decision to initiate the non-GM certification program by Imcopa was mainly motivated by 
                                                           
5 Obtained from oil seeds, lecithin has an emulsifier property valuable as a food ingredient by providing stable and 
smooth mixtures of oil and water in processed foods such as chocolate bars, candy bars, biscuits, snacks and baby 
food. Pelaez et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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Nestle’s demand for non-GM lecithin which is an important ingredient added to several 
industrialized food products. This demand is a preventive strategy adopted by several big food 
companies in Europe who consider this kind of food content a commercial risk because of the 
consumer’s resistance to accepting GM food products. Imcopa was the first company in Brazil to 
launch non-GM certified soybean oil. Approximately 99% of the oil and 97% of the meal is 
exported. Thus, Imcopa exports non-GM soybean and products to more than 250 clients6  in over 
30 countries7 (Traver 2006). 
 
Imcopa works with about eleven co-operatives who supply 80% of the soybeans bought by the 
company. Six co-operatives provide about 70% of the volume used by the company.  Imcopa  
partners with individual farmers and wholesalers who do the segregation of non-GM soybeans. 
The company is located in Paraná, Brazil which is the largest soybean producing State with 
around 20 million tons/year.   Imcopa has several logistical advantages which include proximity 
to production, the presence of adequate infrastructure to move raw material to the processing 
facilities and  easy access to the main export outlet, at the Port of Paranaguá. 
 
In addition, during the period of most heated debate on advantages and disadvantages of 
adopting GMOs in Brazil (1998-2005), the State of Paraná strongly resisted the approval of GM 
crops. This involved the State government’s control and enforcement activities to prevent the 
illegal planting of GM varieties, as well as commercial strategies by several co-operatives 
seeking to create a market differential by implementing their own systems for non-GM soybean 
identity preservation and certification8. When the decision was make to implement the 
traceability system in 1998, Imcopa was well positioned geographically near large supplies of 
non-GM soybeans, available for virtually no premium to local farmers. This gave Imcopa large 
profits during the initial phase of implementation of the non-GM soybean certification system. 
 
The Traceability and Certification System 
 
Imcopa’s traceability and certification system was set up in 1999 by Genetic ID, an American 
company specializing in GM analysis and detection. That same year, Genetic ID and Law 
Laboratories, a company specializing in quality control and the legal compliance of food 
products, formed a partnership which created, Cert ID Ltd. Company.  They began certifying 
Imcopa’s non-GM products. 
 
Imcopa’s traceability and certification system is made up of four stages related to the successive 
activities of soybean production and marketing: 
 
i)  production and multiplication of seeds 
ii)  production of grain  
iii)   industrial processing  
iv)  delivery for export 
                                                           
6 The main client companies are Nestlé, Kraft, Unilever, Porters, Grampian, Amadori, Martini, Danone, Carrefour, 
Tesco, Asda, Agravis, Ewos, Mitsubishi, Nutreco, Solae, Cargill, Bunge, Barry Callebaut, Fenaco and Degussa. 
7 The main countries are France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Austria, UK, Scotland, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Australia, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, 
USA and Canada. 
8 On this process see Pelaez and Albergoni (2004), Brehm and Pelaez (2008) and Nascimento and Pelaez (2008). Pelaez et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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Production and Multiplication of Seeds 
 
In this stage, Imcopa inspects and validates the entire process of seed production and 
multiplication for its suppliers, through the following activities: 
 
  Seed production: The original seeds are produced by companies accredited by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The purchase, testing and distribution of these seeds to co-
operatives are monitored by Imcopa. All original seeds are tested by the co-operatives or 
purchased with non-GM certificates. 
 
  Seed distribution for multiplication: Imcopa monitors the distribution of original seeds 
that are multiplied by co-operatives for later distribution to farmers. 
 
  Seed planting: Seed planting is supervised by the co-operatives’ own agronomists and is 
validated by Imcopa. 
 
  Seed harvest: The harvesting process and seed-storage in silos are monitored by the co-
operative and validated by Imcopa. 
 
  Distribution of seeds for soybean production: After storage, the seeds are classified and 
packed for distribution. The documentation is validated by Imcopa and delivered to the 




During grain production, in addition to inspection and validation of the process, Imcopa carries 
out tests to assure the soybeans’ non-GM identity, as follows: 
 
  Planting: Seeds are delivered to the farmers by their cooperatives, to be planted. The 
process is monitored by the cooperatives and validated by Imcopa. 
 
  Harvest: The harvest is monitored through strip tests9  done by Imcopa. 
 
  Transportation to silos at the cooperatives: Chronologically-numbered samples are 
collected from each truckload. One composite sample for each five trucks is 
homogenized and strip-tested. If the test is negative for GMOs, the trucks are unloaded. If 
the test is positive, all the samples are tested individually to identify the specific truck 
with GM material, which is rejected. Another composite sample, for an entire day of 
grain deliveries, is tested by the co-operative. 
 
  Transportation from the silos to Imcopa facilities: During this stage, chronologically-
numbered samples are also collected from each truckload. To avoid contamination, all 
                                                           
9 “Strip tests” or immunochemical tests are used, among other purposes, to identify GMOs. The method uses 
antibodies to find a GMO molecule. If found, it reacts with the antibody and changes the color of the strip thus 
indicating the presence of GM material. It is a quantitative method that provides a quick result (in about 5 minutes) 
at low cost (around US$ 6 per strip) (Grainnet, 1999). Pelaez et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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trucks are cleaned with air spray guns before they are loaded. A composite sample from 
five truckloads is homogenized and strip-tested. If the test is negative for GMOs, the 
trucks are unloaded. If the test is positive, all the samples are tested individually to 
identify the specific truck with GM material, which is rejected. The samples are kept for 
360 days. Another composite sample, for each seven days of grain deliveries, is sent to be 




During this stage, samples are collected every two hours, as soybeans are unloaded into the 
processing plant. Twice weekly, composite samples are PCR-tested at an accredited laboratory. 
Samples are also collected every two hours from the meal, oil (crude and refined) and lecithin 
units of production. For meal and refined oil, the composite sample of the day is tested for 
GMOs, in addition to physical-chemical tests. For crude oil and lecithin, the composite sample of 
the day only undergoes physical-chemical tests. These composite samples are stored for one 
year. 
 
For meal and crude oil, the composite sample is PCR-tested fortnightly at an accredited 
laboratory. This procedure is applied to refined oil and lecithin every seven days, and the lecithin 
also undergoes microbiological tests. This stage thus requires only that the company have the 
trained personnel and the kits needed to carry out the tests for GM material. 
 
Dispatch for Export 
 
Company care is intensified, because products risk being contaminated by other companies’ 
loads, mainly at port terminals. Procedures include: 
 
  Dispatch of degummed oil: Samples are collected as oil is loaded into trucks and wagons, 
and undergo physio-chemical and microbiological tests. For each shipload a Transaction 
Certificate of Compliance (TCC) is issued, identifying the company traceability and 
assuring the product is non-GM. If required by the client, a PCR test for the lot can be 
provided. 
 
  Dispatch of meal: Samples are collected as the meal is loaded into trucks and wagons. 
Before Imcopa delivers each load to the ships, all conveyor belts and empty ship loaders 
are activated for at least 15 minutes, to assure that no trace of previous loads can come 
into contact with the merchandise. Physicochemical tests are done on daily composite 
samples, which are stored for one year. A TCC is also issued for each shipload. Another 
sample is collected from every hold in the ship, for PCR testing. 
 
 
Below is a flowchart of Imcopa’s traceability and certification system for non-GM soybeans and 
products. 
                                                           
10 PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) is a method to analyze DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) directly in order, among 
other uses, to detect the presence of specific GMO molecules in grain or food products. This method is more 
sensitive than immunochemical methods but also takes longer (two or three days) and costs more (about US$ 200 to 
US$300 per sample) (Grainnet 1999). Pelaez et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of Imcopa’s Traceability and Certification System for Non-Gm Soybeans 
and Products 
Source: Traver (2005) 
Note:   = Critical point in the system. 
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Critical Points in the Control System 
 
There are two critical control points to assure the identity preservation of conventional soybeans 
and products from the purchase of grain to loading at port. The first, and most critical is the 
reception of grain at the collection and storage facilities in the State’s interior region. Significant 
risks exist because farmers began planting part of their land with GM soybeans after they were 
legalized in 2005, thus increasing the probability of blending with non-GM grain. Farmers who 
grow non-GM soybeans, face widespread risk from neighboring farmers who often share 
columbines, which become a vector for contamination of non-GM grain. 
 
Once the grain has been purchased from farmers, the port terminal is the second critical point. 
Despite policy control over GM soybean shipments adopted by the Paraná State government in 
the Paranaguá Port, Imcopa does not assume that the port authorities’ procedures are reliable 
enough, due to the huge flows of raw material from various regions of the country. To minimize 
risks of contamination, Imcopa has an officer of its own at each of the two terminals (Center-
South and Cotriguaçu) it uses to store shipments before loading. Company employees are hired 
exclusively to monitor the movement of conveyor belts and the appropriate cleaning of the silos. 
 
Traceability and Certification Costs 
 
Implementing and maintaining traceability costs break down into four categories: infrastructure 
investment; personnel training expenses; spending on analyses (GMO tests); and the payment of 
premiums to farmers for growing non-GM soybeans. 
 
Infrastructure investments were minor for Imcopa due to the company’s choice to work 
exclusively with non-GM products. They did not need to invest in new silos or manufacturing 
facilities. Investments were limited to a laboratory equipped with a grain processor to carry out 
GM identity tests, which cost little and are accounted for as part of the company’s general 
expenses. The second category, for training of personnel, was done by the certifying company. 
The third category involves operating costs and the purchase of test kits to control identity 
preservation through the stages of cultivation, transportation, processing and storage. The fourth 
category has to do with the expansion of the area planted to GMOs in Brazil, particularly in the 
State of Paraná, following December 2005, when the federal government finally managed to 
push through a law to impose the commercial release of GM soybeans. Moreover, the Paraná 
State government’s policy of banning the dispatch of GM soybeans through the Port of 
Paranaguá was overturned by a September 2006 court order, signifying that all the port’s berths 
could now load GM soybeans. 
 
Imcopa occasionally paid premium prices to rural co-operatives for non-GM soybeans for 
several years, due to an abundance of raw material available in the State of Paraná11. Not until 
2006 did premiums paid to farmers become standard clauses in supply contracts. This also has to 
do with the fact that soybean crushers constitute an oligopsony. 
 
                                                           
11 From 2004 to 2006, the three rural co-operatives in Paraná that had implemented their own non-GM soybean 
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In 2005, ten major crushers purchased 70% of Brazil’s soybean harvest. Specifically in Paraná, 
where 23% of the country’s soybean crushing facilities are concentrated, Imcopa is the leader in 
crushing capacity, with 35% of the State’s installed capacity (Abiove 2005).  Processing 
companies – which are more than just crushers are often global soybean traders12  and gain 
significant bargaining power over co-operatives and individual farmers. This oligopsonic power 
had allowed those companies to retain the bulk or even the entirety of premiums paid by 
importers for non-GM products, until the mid-2000s. 
 
In 1999, the total cost of implementing the Imcopa system was around $ 900,000USD. Of that, 
some $650,000 (72% of the total) went to traceability activities. Imcopa paid the equivalent of 
$250,000 for certification. In that year, Imcopa processed about 250,000 tons of soybeans, which 
means a cost of $3.60/ton (Traver 2006). 
 
In 2006, the company crushed about 2.8 million tons of soybeans, and paid $2 million in 
traceability and certification costs, an average of $0.70/ton of soybeans. Of that, 75% ($1.5 
million) went to running the traceability system, while the other 25% covered certification costs. 
Thus from 1999 to 2006, there was a significant 80% reduction in the unit cost of the company’s 
traceability and certification system. According to Imcopa’s director, this cost reduction was 
mainly due to gains in scale and with the company’s learning curve in running the system. 
Inclusion of $7/ton in premiums paid to farmers in 2006, however, raised the total unit costs for 
the system to around $7.70/ton of processed soybeans (Traver 2008). 
 
In 2008, total costs for maintaining the system rose to $22/ton, due to two factors: higher costs 
with traceability and certification (from $ 0.70/ton to US$ 2/ton) caused by the expansion of GM 
soybean plantations in the proximities of non-GM areas and by the need for more quality control 
to dispatch shipments through Paranaguá Port; and, most particularly, the tripling of premiums 
paid to farmers, from $7/ton to $20/ton  as shown in Table 2. 
 








TOTAL in $USD 
$ $/ton  $  $/ton  $  $/ton 
Traceability 650,000  2.60  1,500,000 0.50 NA  1.70 
Certification 250,000  1.00  500,000  0.20  NA  0.30 
TOTAL 900,000  3.60  2,000,000  0.70  4,000,000  2.00 
Premium
1  NA  5.00  20,000,00 7.00  40,000,000 20.00 
TOTAL + PREMIUM  NA  8.60  22,000,00  7.70  44,000,000  22.00 
Source: Traver (2006, 2008). 
Note: 
1 The value of premiums paid to farmers by Imcopa in 1999 varied depending on the contract negotiated with 
each co-operative; therefore not everyone received US$ 5/ton. NA = Not Available. 
 
Benefits of the System 
 
Three benefits from the traceability and certification system are examined: (i) higher turnover for 
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the company, (ii) the benefit-cost ratio accrued from premiums paid by international buyers for 
the sale of non-GM soybean products and (iii) the diversification of the company’s activities as a 




Premiums paid for non-GM soybean products depend on each year’s market conditions. Non-
GM lecithin brings in the highest premium, at $1,000/ton in 2006. After falling more than 50% 
in 2007 and 2008, this premium returned to its 2006 values in 2009. Fatty acid is the product 
with the most unstable demand. In 2006, it sold with premiums up to $4,500/ton, about 10 times 
more than the market value of the non-certified product. At other times, this market nearly dries 
up with almost no consumers, as was the case in 2008 (Traver 2009). The production of crude 
and refined soybean oil, meanwhile, provides no benefits from the non-GM traceability and 
certification system, since it is sold at no additional premium (Table 3).  
 
Table 3.  Average premiums paid and received by Imcopa on the sale of non-GM soybean 
products, 2006/2009. 
Products  Premiums $/Ton 
2006 2007  2008  2009
**
Raw soybeans*  7  12  20  NA 
Meal  8  14  25  35 - 40 
Crude and refined oil  0  0  0  0 
Lecithin  1,000  400 - 500  500 - 600  1,000 
Fatty acid (tocopherol)  0 – 4,500  NA  NA  NA 
Source: Traver (2006 and 2008), Oliveira (2006) and Campos (2006) 
* Premiums paid by Imcopa to farmers. 
** Forecast. 
 
The company’s benefit-cost ratio can be estimated specifically related to its traceability and 
certification system in 2006 and 2008 in terms of the premiums paid on the sale of meal and 
lecithin. In 2006, Imcopa sold around 2 million tons of meal, with an average premium of $14 
per ton. It sold 25,000 tons of lecithin, with a premium of $1,000 per ton. This brought in a total 
annual added value of $67 million for the company, while total costs for certification and 
traceability were around $2.5 million. In this sense, the company’s benefit-cost ratio concerning 
the adoption of non-GM controls was around 26.8. Even so, additional costs to pay farmers’ 
premiums hiked the system’s total operating expenses to $27.8 million, reducing the ratio to the 
order of 2.4. In 2008, increased premiums paid to farmers substantially reduced the company’s 
benefit-cost ratio from 2.4 to 1.1 (Table 4). 
 
The largest benefit obtained by Imcopa with its certification program came in its growth, with 
the company’s productive capacity expanding eight times, from 250,000 tons per year in 1998 to 
2 million tons per year in 2008. Meanwhile, turnover grew by a factor of 18, from $70 million in 
1998 to approximately $1.3 billion in 2008. The most intense period of growth was from 1998 to 
2003, when turnover grew 328%. In the following years, turnover continued to grow but at lower 
rates. From 2003-2005, the company grew 116%, from 2005-2006 another 53% and from 2006-
2008 by 30% (Table 4). That rapid rate of growth led Imcopa to become the fifth largest soybean 
processer in the country, and number one in Paraná. 
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Table 4. Imcopa’s yearly turnover and benefit-cost ratio: 1998/2008 
Year Turnover 
Total Value of 
Premium Received 
(Meal + Lecithin) 
Total System Cost 
(Traceability + Certification)  Benefit-Cost Ratio 




1998 $70  million  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
2003 $300  million  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
2005 $650  million  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
2006  $1 billion  $67.0 million $2.5  million $27.8  million 26.8  2.4 
2008  $1.3 billion  $47.5 million  $4 million  $44 million  11.9  1.1 
Present value estimated to 2008 at a 12.45 annual interest rate. 
Source: Gazeta Mercantil (2005), Gazeta do Povo (2006) and Traver (2006 and 2008).  
 
 
Additionally, sales of non-GM certified products allowed Imcopa to expand in an economic 
climate in which many soybean processers had to shut down due to hard competition from 
multinationals, especially those with plants located in Argentina. Several factors make the cost of 
producing soybean products in Argentina up to 25% lower than in Brazil: 
 
  The concentration of plants in a single region (80% located in Santa Fé Province)13    
facilitates logistics, particularly for exports. 
 
  The valuation of the Brazilian currency since January 2002 lowered the price 
competitiveness of soybeans and products compared to Argentine output. From January 
2002 to May 2009, the average rate of exchange between the two countries was 0.476 
Real = 1.0 Peso (Banco Central 2009). 
 
  In Brazil, many processing plants are not in soybean-producing regions. This implies the 
payment of a 12% tax (the Tax on Circulation of Merchandise and Services/ICMS) for 
the interstate purchase of raw soybeans. Since the accounting entry of credits to be 
compensated by the processing of meal and oil does not entirely pay the costs of crushers, 
it is advantageous to export soybeans in natura and crush them in Argentina. There the 
taxes are the other way around: grain is more heavily taxed (3.5%), thus favoring the 
export of oil and meal (Valor Econômico 2006). 
 
  Fuel oil and natural gas cost three times more in Brazil than in Argentina, due to 
Argentine government subsidies. Since fuel consumption is 80% of the cost of crushing 
soybeans, soybeans processed in Argentina are much more competitive than those 
crushed in Brazil (Traver 2006). 
 
The competitive advantages of Argentina’s micro- and macro-economic environment has led 
many transnationals to shift part of their soybean crushing units from Brazil to Argentina. 
Companies like Bunge and Cargill decided to forego investments in Brazilian plants, in order to 
prioritize the construction and expansion of plants in Argentina14. 
                                                           
13 On this point, see Ghezan, G. et al. (2006).  
14 In 2006, Bunge began crushing in a plant expansion in Buenos Aires, able to produce 19,000 tons/day, while 
Cargill also invested in Argentina, in a plant whose crushing capacity is 12,000 tons/day (Valor Econômico, 2006). 
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Imcopa’s main motivation for implementing the identity preservation system for non-GM 
soybean products was demand from major food corporations such as Nestlé and Kraft Foods, 
eager to avoid having their products labeled “GM” in Europe. This situation allowed Imcopa to 
negotiate a premium price for certified lecithin from non-GM soybeans that was five times the 
going market price.  Imcopa was thus assured not only a rapid return on its investments, but also 
a high rate of profit as it operated the system we have just described. 
 
Since lecithin is a byproduct of oil production, all stages in the process had to be traced in order 
to certify each of the products. The company therefore started seeking clients abroad for its non-
GM meal and oil. Although there was significant demand for non-GM products by the late 
1990’s, particularly in Europe, it was hard for Imcopa to find consumers willing to pay 
premiums for certified non-GM products. This market segment grew slowly. Imcopa earned 
virtually no premiums on its soybean meal sales from certifying this product during the first year 
the traceability system was in operation. In the second year, the company managed to 
differentiate prices on the export of 60% of the meal it processed. It was only in the third year of 
operations that Imcopa earned premiums on 100% of its meal production, ranging from $3 to $4 
per ton. 
 
As it sought market segments for higher value-added products, however, the company began to 
identify new production opportunities based on differentiating the protein content of its meal for 
more specific markets, such as fish food. Soybean meal with 40-50% protein has such a high 
sugar content that, in water, it tends to ferment and create a toxic environment for fish. 
Extracting the sugar reduces this effect, in addition to raising the meal’s protein content, thus 
adding value to the product. At the same time, the molasses byproduct obtained by extracting the 
sugar is a good substrate for producing ethanol. Soybean ethanol obtained from this molasses can 
be used in pharmaceuticals, beverages and to produce biofuel. The company also uses its 
soybean molasses as an energy source for its own production lines, thus reducing costs 
significantly, since energy is the most important cost item in soybean processing (Traver 2006). 
 
Imcopa’s strategy to add value to it’s product line through non-GM certification gave rise to new 
opportunities to differentiate production by increasing the protein content of its soybean meal. As 
a result, these more high-quality market segments moved the company to implement 
complementary quality-control programs that in turn demanded new certifications and new 
adaptations of its production structure. Imcopa has now earned another ten quality certificates15, 
which complement a product-quality differentiation strategy in a market traditionally known for 




Imcopa adopted quality-control in order to implement its non-GM soybean traceability system, 
based on a recombination of existing productive resources, and in so doing lowered the costs of 
                                                           
15 ISO 9000; ISO 14000; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP); Good Manufacturing Practices 
(GMP); GMP-Animal Feed; Kosher Certificate; Halal Certificate; Salmonella-free Program; Special Granulometric 
Control Program; Agricultural Sustainable Production Certificate (Pro-Terra). Pelaez et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010 
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both implementing and operating the system. Together with the high premiums it initially earned 
on non-GM lecithin sales and later on its non-GM soybean meal, with no need to pass part of the 
profits on to farmers, in the system’s early years Imcopa maintained quite a high level benefit-
cost ratio. 
 
That benefit-cost ratio began to decline when the sale of GM soybeans was legalized in Brazil in 
December 2005 and the dissemination of GM plantations increased the risks for preserving the 
identity of the company’s product, along with the costs of its traceability system. Also as a result 
of this, Imcopa was obliged to adopt a more effective strategy to promote the planting of non-
GM soybeans, through the payment of higher premiums to farmers. That strategy was the key to 
reducing information asymmetries between the opportunities the company had identified on 
overseas markets for non-GM soybean products and the opportunities perceived by farmers, who 
live in a farm-supply market controlled by seed and pesticide companies. 
 
Considering this drive for short-term returns on investment, the economic feasibility of 
maintaining non-GM soybean traceability and certification systems capable of sustaining the 
coexistence of GM and non-GM crops depends above all on the presence of markets willing to 
offer a price differential attractive to all players involved in the production chain. Though, the 
logic of this market niche depends on a set of factors involving the balance between social 
acceptance and resistance of GM food in which the premium paid by the existence of a 
segregation system seems to be the less important one. 
 
In addition to the extraordinary earnings from its certification of non-GM products, the product 
differentiation based on a recombination of the company’s own resources revealed new 
productive opportunities and created previously non-existent market niches for soybean meal. 
Actually, productive opportunities arising from the sale of non-GM soybeans are mainly 
concentrated in the grain processing stage, as a function of the company’s own operational 
environment. In Imcopa’s case, the expansion of its involvement in global food and feed markets 
allowed it to become part of a more complex network of commercial and production relations. In 
this new environment, market niches that emerge for products with higher value added allow a 
medium-sized, family-owned company like Imcopa to expand its share in a market traditionally 
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